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Abstract 
This paper highlights the prejudicial effect of the rule within the 
rules of the Government Employees Pension Fund (GEPF), 
which allows this fund to create a "divorce debt" for its member 
when the court has ordered that part of such a member's pension 
interest be paid over to his or her spouse. I argue that this debt 
is in fact a loan which is provided to the member, which he or she 
would be expected to pay when he or she exits the fund, with 
interest. This is despite the fact that the rules of the GEPF do not 
permit the granting of loans to its members. I argue that the 
creation of such a loan has the effect of diminishing the GEPF's 
member’s benefits, and thus threaten his or her social security, 
and can lead to the member becoming unable to provide for 
himself or herself when he or she reaches retirement age.  
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1 Introduction 
Given South Africa’s low savings rate and present twin fiscal and current 
account deficits, pension funds play a vital role in ensuring that people in 
formal employment are able to save for their retirement. Pension funds also 
play an important role in the economic development of the country.1 As 
such, the manner in which pension funds are managed has far reaching 
consequences for the financial stability of the country. The manner in which 
pension funds are managed can also have an impact on members of 
pension funds’ ability to provide for themselves when they exit such pension 
funds due to retirement, resignation, dismissal, retrenchments and most 
recently, divorce  
The South African retirement industry is divided into two systems. On the 
one hand, there is a private sector which is governed by the Pension Funds 
Act2 and consists of small to medium pension funds. On the other hand, 
there are several public pension funds governed and regulated by their own 
legislation.3 All pension funds, irrespective of whether they fall within the 
public or private sector, differ in terms of the number of their members and 
the extent of the assets they manage. The Government Employees Pension 
Fund (hereinafter referred to as the "GEPF") is the largest pension fund 
scheme not only in South Africa but in Africa as a whole in terms of both 
membership and assets. The GEPF has more than 1.2 million active 
members, all of whom are government employees.4  
                                            
*  Motseotsile Clement Marumoagae. LLB LLM (Wits) LLM (NWU) Diploma in Insolvency 
Law Practice (UP). Senior Lecturer, University of the Witwatersrand. E-mail: 
Clement.Marumoagae@wits.ac.za.  
1  National Treasury 2012 http://www.treasury.gov.za/comm_media/press/2012/Incen-
tivising%20non-retirement%20savings.pdf. 
2  Act 24 of 1956 (hereinafter referred to as PFA). See Mhango 2014 Speculum Juris 
102, who correctly submits that the Pension Funds Act is the primary legislation that 
regulates private pension fund organizations. 
3  For instance, the Communications Pension Fund (Telkom Pension Find) and Post 
Office Pension Fund are regulated by Post Office Act 44 of 1958, the Transnet Pension 
Fund is regulated by the Transnet Pension Fund Act 62 of 1990, as amended, and the 
Government Employees Pension Fund (hereinafter referred to as GEPF) is regulated 
by Government Employees Pension Law of 1996, as amended. Also see generally 
Marumoagae 2013 De Rebus 38-41, Ngewu v Post Office Retirement Fund 2013 4 
BCLR 421 (CC) and Wiese v Government Employees Pension Fund 2012 6 BCLR 
599 (CC). 
4  See GEPF date unknown http://www.gepf.gov.za/index.php/about_us/article/who-is-
gepf, where it is also stated that the GEPF is a defined benefit pension fund that was 
established in May 1996 when various public sector funds were consolidated. Its core 
business is to manage and administer pensions and other benefits for government 
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Pension funds are managed by boards of trustees, who are in turn guided 
by pension funds’ rules on how to manage and administer their funds. The 
GEPF is the only pension fund in South Africa which is empowered by its 
rules to pay over claims which non-member spouses have in terms of the 
provisions of the Divorce Act5 against its members when the parties divorce, 
using methods which are not compliant with section 7 (8) of the Divorce Act. 
Rule 14.10.9 of the rules of the GEPF read together with rule 24 A(2) (d), 
which was introduced by recent amendments to the GEPF law, allows the 
fund to make payment to the non-member spouse and to create what is 
referred to as a "divorce debt", which the divorcing member is expected to 
pay back to the fund with interest when he or she exits the fund. It is 
unfortunate that the difficulties arising from the creation of the "divorce debt" 
by the rules of the GEPF have not yet received academic and judicial 
attention in South Africa. Not much has been written on this issue yet.  
The purpose of this paper is to highlight the prejudice which is created by 
the rules of the GEPF against its divorcing members. I will consider the 
constitutionality of these rules in the light of the GEPF members' right to 
social security and the right to be treated the same as members of other 
pension funds when they divorce. In this paper I argue that the GEPF's rules 
unjustifiably treat divorcing members of the GEPF as the fund’s indirect 
investment option by granting loans to them which they are forced to pay 
back with interest in circumstances which are not advocated by section 7 
(8) of the Divorce Act. This is a challenge which divorced members of the 
GEPF are experiencing when exiting the fund, at which point they are 
required to pay back such "divorce debts" arising from amounts which were 
paid on their behalf when their former spouses claimed their share of the 
pension interests in accordance with sections 7 (7) and (8) of the Divorce 
Act.  
This paper addresses a practical problem which seldom reaches superior 
courts for determination, which I have encountered in practice. It is 
unfortunate that most of these matters end up in regional magistrates' courts 
and are thus not reported, which might explain the lack of academic 
coverage as far as they are concerned. I hope that this article will encourage 
divorce lawyers to advise their clients to challenge this rule in the High Court 
when the opportunity presents itself. The discussion relating to the sharing 
of the pension interest when parties divorce and some of the challenges 
                                            
employees in South Africa and it currently has in excess of 300 000 pensioners and 
beneficiaries, and assets worth more than R1 trillion. 
5  70 of 1979. 
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arising thereto are beyond the scope of this paper and have been discussed 
elsewhere.6  
2  Divorce debt created by the GEPF rules 
2.1  Clean break principle 
The GEPF is administered by the Government Pensions Administration 
Agency on behalf of National Treasury and reports directly to the Minister 
of Finance. The fund is a direct initiative of the government to ensure that 
public servants when they retire are able to support themselves without 
relying on the state. The GEPF is regulated by Proclamation 21 of 1996, 
which is the Government Employees Pension Law. This law contains the 
rules of the GEPF. There seems not to be a difference between the 
Government Employees Pension Law and the rules of the fund. In actual 
fact, the rules and law are contained in the same document, titled 
"Government Employees Pension Rule and Law" and obtainable from the 
GEPF website.7 In 2011 the Government Employees Pension Law, 1996 
was amended by the Government Employees Pension Law Amendment 
Act.8 This amendment Act sought to align the GEPF with private pension 
funds by introducing the so-called clean break principle, which allows the 
fund to pay over the portion of its divorced member's pension interest to that 
member's ex-spouse when directed to do so by a decree of divorce.9  
A detailed discussion relating to the clean break principle is beyond the 
scope of this paper. However, it suffices to mention that the GEPF board of 
trustees took a unique decision to establish a procedure within the GEPF 
rules which allows the fund to comply with the clean break principle by 
effecting payment to the non-member spouse to satisfy the divorce order, 
                                            
6  See Marumoagae 2014 Speculum Juris 54-73 and Marumoagae 2014 PER 2488-
2524. 
7  GEPF 2014 http://www.gepf.gov.za/index.php/about_us/article/pension-fund-rules. 
8  19 of 2011. 
9  Nevondwe 2014 "Divorce orders: issues for pension funds" 8, who argues that "[t]he 
clean-break principle was introduced in the private sector pension funds on 1 
November 2008 by the introduction of the Pension Funds Amendment Act 11 of 2007 
and Financial Services Laws General Amendment Act. These two pieces of legislation 
amended section 7(8)(a) (i) of the Divorce Act which provides that a non-member 
spouse of a member of a retirement fund on divorce could be awarded by a court a 
portion of benefits that the member would have received had he or she resigned on 
the date of divorce. However, in terms of the Divorce Act read with the Pension Funds 
Act, the non-member spouse was only entitled to receive that share when the member 
became entitled to a benefit in terms of the Rules of the fund, that is, on his or her 
latter retirement or termination of membership which could been many years after the 
date of divorce. Post amendments provide that a benefit is deemed to accrue to the 
principal member on the date a decree of divorce is granted by a court".  
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but in the process unjustifiably creating a "debt" for its divorcing members. 
Rule 14.10 of the GEPF rules purports to deal with the assignment of a 
share of a member's pension interest to his or her former spouse. However, 
the fund does not assign a portion of its divorcing member’s pension interest 
to the non-member spouse. Instead, the fund pays such an amount from its 
reserves without interfering with the member's pensionable service 
generally or the pension benefits specifically of its divorcing member. Rule 
14.10.1 to rule 14.10.5 of the GEPF rules deal with the election by the non-
member spouse and the manner of payment of his or her portion in 
accordance with the divorce order.  
2.2  Non Compliance with Section 7(8) of the Divorce Act 
None of the provisions of rule 14.10 of the GEPF rules are clear as to where 
exactly the fund would obtain the money which it pays over to the non-
member spouse to satisfy the divorce order. It is clear however, that such 
an amount is not taken from the divorcing member’s pension interest as 
directed in the divorce decree in accordance with section 7 (8) of the Divorce 
Act. This can be deduced from rule 14.10.6.1 of the GEPF rules, which 
empowers the fund after having made payment to the non-member spouse 
to record in the books of the fund a "divorce debt" in respect of the member 
in the amount of the former spouse's share. It is submitted that the idea 
behind the creation of the "divorce debt" came after the realisation that the 
clean break principle interferes with both the pensionable service and the 
pension credit of divorcing members. A system which would allow the fund 
to comply with the clean break principle and at the same time not to interfere 
with its divorcing members' pension benefits had to be put in place. The 
board realised that  
[w]hen the benefit is paid to the non-member spouse on divorce … the 
member’s benefit would be reduced. GEPF could either reduce the members’ 
pensionable service or create a 'debt' which would be deducted against their 
benefit when they finally exited the Fund.10  
It is worth noting that the fact that the divorce would lead to the reduction of 
the pensionable interest of a member of a pension fund, when a portion of 
the pension interest has been claimed in accordance with the divorce 
decree, is a direct financial consequence of marriages in community of 
property. This is because the member's pension interest is deemed to be 
part of his or her estate, which entitles his or her spouse to be able to claim 
                                            
10  GEPF 2014 http://www.gepf.gov.za/index.php/news/article/gepf-invests-r312-million-
in-a-solar-park-project. In this document the manner in which the GEPF understands 
the Clean Break Principle is unconvincingly explained.  
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a portion thereof during divorce.11 This is applicable to all pension funds in 
South Africa, upon the divorce of their members who are married either in 
community of property or out of community of property with the application 
of the accrual system. Indeed, divorce would affect the pension benefits of 
members of pension funds. However, the board of trustees of the GEPF 
chose to treat the GEPF and its divorcing members differently from the 
members of other funds, and thus created a system which would circumvent 
the impact of the clean break principle on its members by opting to create a 
"debt" which would be deducted against their divorcing members’ benefits 
when they exit the Fund. The creation of a "debt" resembles the granting of 
a loan by the fund to its divorcing members 
Even the South African Law Commission (as it was referred to then) did not 
envisage the fund’s making loans to its members for the purpose of settling 
a claim in terms of the divorce order, and paying the non-member spouse 
from any source other than the member’s portion of his pension benefits. At 
the time when the clean break principle was not yet in force, the commission 
stated that it: 
accepted the principle that the right which a member of a pension fund has to receive 
a pension in accordance with the rules of the fund at a future date or event specified 
by such rules, forms an important part of such member's assets even before the 
pension becomes payable although the pension is not realisable before the specified 
date or event. The said right was described as the member's "pension interest". It 
was further accepted that in the event of the divorce of such member his or her 
divorced spouse (referred to as the non-member spouse) ought to be able to share 
in the member's pension interest in accordance with the matrimonial property 
dispensation which is applicable to the marriage. It was therefore recommended that 
the pension interest of a member of a pension fund should, for purposes of the 
division of the assets of the spouses on divorce, be deemed to be part.12 
It is crucial to note that now, as the law stands, the date of accrual of the 
benefit has been accelerated to the date of divorce. The non-member 
spouse does not have to wait until the member exits the fund at a future 
date, which may be long after the divorce, in order to be able to claim and 
receive his or her share of the member's pension interest.13 This shows that 
the non-member spouse’s claim lies against the member’s pension interest 
                                            
11  See section 7 (7) of the Divorce Act.  
12  SALC Discussion paper 1998 http://www.justice.gov.za/salrc/dpapers/dp77_prj112_ 
1998.pdf. 
13  See Cockcroft v Mine Employees' Pension Fund 2007 3 BPLR 296 (PFA), Mouton v 
Southern Staff Pension Fund 2003 4 BPLR 4581 (PFA), wherein this position was 
found to be unsatisfactory in that it undermined the clean break principle. Also see 
Nevondwe 2012 Insurance and Tax 32-35 and Ngewu v Post Office Retirement Fund 
2013 4 BCLR 421 (CC) and Wiese v Government Employees Pension Fund 2012 6 
BCLR 599 (CC).  
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held in that member's pension credit, and not against the fund itself. The 
non-member spouse is entitled to only a percentage awarded in terms of 
the divorce decree relating to what the member has been able to 
accumulate in his or her pension benefits. It is difficult to understand the 
wisdom of the GEPF’s actually lending its divorcing members money to 
settle the non-member spouses’ claims, while its members already have 
resources in the form of their pension interests, which would enable them 
to satisfy such claims. It is submitted that the "debt" system created by the 
GEPF is against the spirit of section 7 (8) of the Divorce Act14, which 
provides that: 
Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law or the rules of any pension 
fund- the court granting a decree of divorce in respect of a member of such a 
fund, may make an order that-  
(a) Any part of the pension interest of that member which, by virtue of 
subsection (7), is due or assigned to the other party to the divorce action 
concerned, shall be paid by that fund to that: 
(i) other party when any pension benefits accrue in respect of that member; 
....: 
This section clearly empowers the court to directly order the pension fund 
scheme, irrespective of what is contained in its rules, to pay the percentage 
indicated in the divorce decree of its member’s pension interest to the non-
member spouse. It can be argued that this section does not necessarily 
restrict or prohibit pension funds from settling the non-member spouse’s 
claim by taking amounts from any source other than such a member's 
pension benefits. However, it is argued that this was not the intention of the 
legislature. Pension funds should simply comply with the decree of divorce 
and deduct part of their member’s pension interest and award it to the non-
member spouse. Such a claim should be satisfied directly by the member's 
pension interest and not from any other source, because the decree of 
divorce would be explicit in that regard. Furthermore, section 7 (8) clearly 
                                            
14  See Marumoagae 2013 De Rebus 38, who reflected that this section was brought as 
a result to the 1989 amendments which were made to the Divorce Act "through the 
Divorce Amendment Act 7 of 1989. These amendments allowed some relief to a 
spouse from whom the member was divorced who might otherwise receive nothing 
from the marriage. Prior to the amendment of the Divorce Act by the Divorce 
Amendment Act 7 of 1989, a pension interest which had not yet accrued, such as an 
interest in a pension fund, was not regarded as an asset in the estate of a spouse. 
After the amendment, which came into force on 1 August 1989, section 7(7)(a) was 
introduced to the Divorce Act and deemed a pension interest to be an asset in a 
spouse's estate for purposes of determining patrimonial benefits. The pension interest 
is defined in section 1 of the Divorce Act to mean the benefits to which the member of 
the fund would have been entitled in terms of the rules of the fund if his or her 
membership had been terminated on the date of the divorce on account of his or her 
resignation from office".  
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provides the non-member spouse with an entitlement to lay a claim directly 
to the member's pension interest and not against the fund itself. There is 
therefore no need for the fund to satisfy the claim out of its own coffers. The 
divorcing member's pension benefits should be reduced by the fund to 
satisfy the non-member's spouse's claim. It is totally unnecessary for the 
fund to intervene with a view to "protecting" the member spouse’s pension 
benefits from such a claim by itself undertaking to pay the claim on behalf 
of its member. This section specifically states that "any part of the pension 
interest of that member" shall be paid to the non-member spouse.  
It is worrying that the rules of the GEPF do not make provision for 
consultation with the divorcing member of the fund to make an election as 
to whether the fund should satisfy the divorce claim on his or her behalf or 
simply comply with section 7 (8) of the Divorce Act by paying out the claim 
as directed in the divorce decree. This would provide the member with an 
opportunity to decide for himself or herself whether the fund should "protect" 
his or her pension benefits as well as his or her pensionable service by 
satisfying his or her former spouse's divorce claim on his or her behalf and 
thus create a "debt" against his or her name which he or she would be 
obliged to pay back when he or she exits the fund. It is unfortunate that this 
is done automatically without any consultation. Hence, in my view it is 
prejudicial to the divorcing members of the GEPF. Furthermore, even if 
there was provision for such consultation, the GEPF would still need to do 
more to educate its members regarding the option available to them when 
they are divorcing, as well as the advantages and disadvantages of the 
choices to be made, so that divorcing members can be in a position to make 
informed decisions.  
It is worth noting that section 7 (8) of the Divorce Act effectively adds divorce 
as one of the grounds which may trigger the release of the member's 
pension interest and the division thereof, together with resignation, 
retirement, dismissal and retrenchment. Now, if the GEPF when its 
members divorce does not pay off the non-member spouses’ claims directly 
from its members’ pension interests, it effectively eliminates divorce as one 
of the trigger events which would lead to the release of its members' pension 
benefits. This means that the GEPF insists on making sure that its members 
could cash in their benefits from the fund only through resignation, 
retrenchment, dismissal or retirement. The fund would interfere with its 
members' pension benefits only when these events occur and not when 
members divorce. In order to achieve this and not to be seen as avoiding 
the application of the clean break principle, the board of trustees decided 
that the non-member spouse would be paid by the fund itself on behalf of 
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its member in order not to interfere with the pension credit of the member, 
thus forcing the member when he or she exits the fund to pay back the 
amount which was paid by the fund to his or her former spouse. This means 
that the member's pension benefits and service are not adjusted in 
accordance with the divorce decree, and continues as if there was no 
divorce at all, which is contrary to what is expected from the fund by section 
7 (8) of the Divorce Act.  
By making provision in its rules to create such a "divorce debt", the GEPF 
effectively operates a business of indirectly granting loans to its members. 
It is well known in the private retirement industry that section 19 (5) of the 
Pension Funds Act allows funds regulated under this Act to grant housing 
loans to its members, but there is no such provision in the rules of the GEPF. 
The idea of the "divorce debt" created by the rules of the GEPF is surprising 
because it is well known that the GEPF does not lend money to any member 
or pensioner, simply because its rules do not make provision for loans. 
Hence, this "debt" is called a "divorce debt" instead of a loan. However, the 
manner in which it is granted resembles that in which a loan is made. 
2.3  Lack of Consent and Obligation to pay Interest 
Rule 14.10.9 of the rules of the GEPF provides that when a benefit becomes 
payable to the member in terms of these rules- 
14.10.9.1 the amount of the gratuity, if any, then payable to the member must 
be reduced by the amount of the divorce debt; and 
14.10.9.2 if the amount of the divorce debt exceeds the amount of the gratuity 
and there is an annuity payable to the member then- 
(a) the capital value of the annuity must be determined by the 
actuary; 
(b) the value determined by the actuary must be reduced by an 
amount equal to the balance of the divorce debt then remaining; 
and 
(c) the capital value that results from this calculation must be 
annuitised by the actuary on a basis determined by the board in 
consultation with the actuary to determine the amount of the 
annuity which will then be payable.15 
                                            
15  This rule must be read in conjunction with rule 24A (2)(d), which was introduced by 
the Government Employees Pension Fund Law Amendment Act 19 of 2011, which 
provides that: The amount of any pension benefit that is subsequently payable to the 
member in terms of the rules will be reduced by the equivalent of the amount of the 
share of the pension interest of the member which— (i) was deemed to accrue to the 
member as a benefit in advance of the benefit ordinarily payable in terms of the rules; 
and (ii) was assigned to the member’s former spouse, less the amount of any 
additional voluntary contributions, if any, paid by the member to the Fund from time to 
time, and accumulated over the period from the date on which payment to the former 
spouse or transfer to the approved fund as referred to in paragraph (e) took place to 
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At the time when the non-member spouse makes a claim to the member's 
pension interest in accordance with the divorce order, while not settling the 
claim from the member’s pension benefits, the GEPF would nonetheless 
pay a certain or an ascertainable amount in terms of the percentage which 
the fund is ordered to pay by the court. It is then surprising that at the time 
when the member exits the fund such a member is required to pay back the 
"divorce debt" which is essentially the amount which was paid to the 
member’s former spouse plus interest, as if such a member agreed to take 
up a loan with the fund. This is clear from the unconvincing explanatory 
article published on the GEPF's website, which among other things 
unequivocally and categorically states that: 
The new rules state that on the date of payment of a divorce benefit GEPF will 
create a debt against the member that is equal to the amount payable to the 
non-member spouse. The debt amount will build up, with interest, up until the 
member exits the Fund (and it will be reduced to the extent that the debt is 
partially repaid over the member's remaining period of service in the Fund). At 
the date of the member spouse’s exit from the Fund the total value of the 
benefit will be determined, and will then be decreased by the outstanding 
amount of debt owed.16 
This clearly illustrates that the GEPF is in the business of granting its 
members interest bearing loans, despite its rules making no provision for 
such. Assuming that the amount provided is not a loan, it is difficult to 
understand why such an amount would attract interest from the date it was 
paid to the non-member spouse to the date which the member is exiting the 
fund. It is more disturbing that in terms of rule 14.10.9.2 of the GEPF rules, 
it is possible for the "divorce debt" to be more than the gratuity or rather the 
value of the pension benefits due to the member when he or she exits the 
fund. If this happens then the fund's actuary has to determine the actual 
amount which will then be ultimately payable to the member. This simply 
means that without the intervention of the court the fund treats itself as a 
"secured creditor" of its divorced member, proves its own claim against its 
member on his or her pension benefits, executes its own claim against him 
or her, and ultimately ensures that it is paid because it holds the pension 
benefits on behalf of its member. Even if the member does not agree with 
the fund's methods, there would not be much that he or she could do except 
to review the fund’s decision through a court of law, which process might be 
financially unsustainable for the member concerned. It is equally not helpful 
                                            
the date on which the member first became entitled to a part or the whole of the 
balance of the benefit, with interest as the Board from time to time deems appropriate. 
16  GEPF 2014 http://www.gepf.co.za/index.php/news/article/gepf-rule-changes. 
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that the fund determines how much the member owes it through complex 
actuarial calculation which members may not be able to understand, and 
then decides how much is due to the member after satisfying its claim. 
Clearly this is unacceptable, and it is possible that the majority of the 
members of the GEPF, while aware of this system, may nonetheless not 
challenge this system, which ultimately prejudices them by substantially 
unnecessarily reducing their benefits.  
Even though the member did not consent to the creation of the "divorce 
debt", such a debt attracts interest.17 Member spouses are obliged to settle 
this debt together with its accumulated interest. Further, given the fact that 
the rules of the GEPF provide for the creation of this "debt", this simply 
means that the debt is created by the operation of the rules themselves 
without any consultation with divorcing members, particularly if it is taken 
that such members must have read and understood the rules. It is submitted 
that the GEPF through its debt system, is acting as a credit provider. While 
the discussion regarding the impact (if any) of the National Credit Act18 is 
beyond the scope of this paper, it suffices to mention that it is important that 
credit providers when granting credit must comply with this Act. They must 
explain all the costs of granting a loan to the consumer, failing which they 
might be opening themselves to reckless lending.19 It is submitted that if the 
GEPF creates a "divorce debt" which at the time when its member exits the 
fund would substantially reduce his or her pension benefits after the fund 
has paid itself, that would amount to reckless lending, because it would 
affect the member's ability to care for him/herself after his or her exit from 
the fund, which would be especially bad if the member had reached 
retirement age. It is submitted further that if indeed the "divorce debt" is a 
loan, then the rules of the GEPF must make express provision for this, and 
there must be a credit agreement between the fund and its divorcing 
member, which outlines the terms thereto. This would ensure that the 
divorcing member was adequately informed of how much was paid to his or 
her former spouse and how much he or she is expected to pay back to the 
fund when he or she exits the fund, as well as how the interest which is 
                                            
17  See Rule 14.10.9 of the rules of the GEPF read together with rule 24 A(2) (d). 
18  34 of 2005. 
19  Section 81 of the National Credit Act 34 of 2005. Also see Standard Bank of South 
African Ltd v Kelly (unreported) case number 23427/2010 of 25 January 2011 and Bell 
2006 Business Law & Tax Review 9, who argues that "[a] credit agreement is reckless 
if at the time it was concluded, a credit provider failed to conduct an assessment or 
despite having conducted a proper assessment concluded the agreement when the 
available information indicated that the consumer did not generally understand the 
proposed agreement or that the transaction would render the consumer over-
indebted". 
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attracted by that debt would be calculated. However, should the rules of the 
GEPF make provision for the fund to grant loans to its members for the 
purposes of settling divorce debts, that would be contrary to the spirit of 
section 7 (8) of the Divorce Act, as argued above. 
3  Infringement of the right to social security and to be 
treated equally and fairly 
3.1 The right to social security 
It cannot be disputed that the money which employees save and invest in 
their pension schemes forms the cornerstone of their retirement financial 
security. Such savings and investments are made on the basis of the fact 
that upon retirement, such employees would not be a financial burden to the 
state and they will continue to comfortably support themselves. Indeed, 
when a person retires from active employment, he or she still wishes to 
maintain more or less the same standard of living that he or she enjoyed 
during his or her working life. A person who is employed would need some 
form of income during old age for his or her own support and that of his or 
her family. Pension benefits are intended for the protection of members of 
retirement funds and their dependants and should therefore not be eroded 
unnecessarily.20 It is unfortunate, however, that the rules of the GEPF allow 
the fund to unnecessarily erode the pension benefits of its divorcing 
members by creating a system which can potentially reduce their benefits 
when they exit the fund. The creation of a "divorce debt", which makes 
divorcing members of the fund indebted to the fund by amounts which are 
not necessarily determinable at the time the debt is created, and which are 
going to be determined ony at the time when divorcing members exit the 
fund, after actuarial calculations have been made by the fund’s actuaries, 
threatens the members’ right to social security as envisaged in section 27 
of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. Section 27(1)(c) 
provides that everyone has a right to have access to social security.21 One 
idea behind social security initiatives in the form of pension funds is, among 
others, to guarantee an adequate living standard and also to safeguard the 
standard of living of employees when they are no longer working in order to 
ensure that they do not depend on the state.22 
The threat is based on the fact that such a debt attracts interest, a 
percentage of which is not disclosed on the rules of the fund, which means 
                                            
20  Manamela 2007 SA Merc LJ 189. 
21  See generally Olivier and Van Rensburg 2000 LDD 87-99. 
22  Khoza "History of retirement funds" 6.  
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that the amount which divorcing members are obliged to pay back to the 
fund can be more than half if not more than the amount which such 
members would be eligible to receive from the fund. This might indeed be 
the case if the non-member spouse was awarded 50 % or more of the 
member's pension interest through the divorce decree, which is normally 
the case in divorce disputes. If the fund did not interfere with the member’s 
pension benefits, in that the fund paid the amount from within its reserves, 
then the member would be indebted to the fund in the amount equal to the 
amount paid by the fund to his or her former spouse, but most importantly, 
plus an undisclosed amount of  interest. Depending on the number of years 
which the member would still be active within the fund, such interest may 
be substantial. If so, this would drastically reduce his or her benefits when 
he or she exits the fund, and would ultimately affect his or her ability to live 
a comfortable life when he or she retires. It is doubtful whether the "divorce 
debt" system created by the rules of the GEPF is reasonable, as it could 
potentially impoverish its divorcing members and compel them to rely on the 
state upon their retirement. It is submitted that divorcing members of the 
GEPF could successfully challenge the GEPF’s debt system on the basis 
that it unjustifiably infringes upon their right to social security, and iss 
therefore unconstitutional. 
3.2 The right to equality 
The fact that the GEPF is the only fund which implements a debt system for 
its divorcing members might also make the fund vulnerable to a 
constitutional challenge under the equality clause of the Bill of Rights. This 
is because divorcing member spouses of the GEPF are treated differently 
from divorcing members of other pension funds governed by either the PFA 
or other laws, who are not burdened by indirect loans from their pension 
funds. It is submitted that this differential treatment violates section 9(1) of 
the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. In order to assess 
whether or not the debt system unfairly discriminates against members of 
the GEPF, the courts would employ the unfair discrimination test crafted by 
the Constitutional Court in Harksen v Lane.23 It is questionable whether the 
                                            
23  In 1997 11 BCLR 1489 (CC) para 54, the Court laid down the test as follows: (a) Does 
the provision differentiate between people or categories of people? If so, does the 
differentiation bear a rational connection to a legitimate government purpose? If it does 
not then there is a violation of section 8(1). Even if it does bear a rational connection, 
it might nevertheless amount to discrimination; (b) Does the differentiation amount to 
unfair discrimination? This requires a two stage analysis: (b)(i) Firstly, does the 
differentiation amount to "discrimination"? If it is on a specified ground, then 
discrimination will have been established. If it is not on a specified ground, then 
whether or not there is discrimination will depend upon whether, objectively, the 
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debt system bears a rational connection to a legitimate governmental 
purpose.24 The GEPF might argue that by creating a debt system it has 
sought to protect its divorcing members' pension benefits so that they 
cannot be affected by the divorce, which has the effect of reducing the 
pensionable service of its members, when the pension interest has to be 
divided. While the fund might be protecting the member at the time of the 
divorce, however, the fund itself creates the same threat (if not a more 
extensive threat) to the detriment of the member when the member exits the 
fund by reducing the member's benefits by the amount of the debt plus the 
interest it charges. Perhaps if there was no interest payable on that amount, 
such an argument might hold water. It is submitted that by making provision 
for the debt system, the GEPF has fallen foul of the constitutional standard 
of equality, because this system does not have a legitimate purpose or a 
rational relationship to the purpose advanced to validate it.25 It is further 
submitted that the GEPF does not seem to be offering any convincing 
explanation, let alone a rational basis, for creating a debt system, while 
other pension funds are not making such a provision.  
It is hoped that this article will spark a debate not only between divorce 
attorneys and pension law scholars but also administrators within the GEPF 
and relevant government officials who would hopefully provide a contextual 
understand of why this system was created. 
4 Conclusion 
It has been shown in this paper that the GEPF is the only fund which on the 
date of the payment of a divorce claim to its member’s former spouse 
creates a "divorce debt" against its member that is equal to the amount 
payable to the former spouse. I have argued that there is no rational 
justification for the creation of such a debt, and that this system amounts to 
the GEPF’s merely granting its divorcing members loans and thus treating 
                                            
ground is based on attributes and characteristics which have the potential to impair 
the fundamental human dignity of persons as human beings or to affect them 
adversely in a comparably serious manner; (b)(ii) If the differentiation amounts to 
"discrimination", does it amount to "unfair discrimination"? If it has been found to have 
been on a specified ground, then unfairness will be presumed. If on an unspecified 
ground, unfairness will have to be established by the complainant. The test of 
unfairness focuses primarily on the impact of the discrimination on the complainant 
and others in his or her situation. If, at the end of this stage of the enquiry, the 
differentiation is found not to be unfair, then there will be no violation of section 8(2); 
(c) If the discrimination is found to be unfair then a determination will have to be made 
as to whether the provision can be justified under the limitations clause. 
24  Van der Merwe v Road Accident Fund 2006 4 SA 230 (CC) para 48. 
25  Prinsloo v Van der Linde 1997 3 SA 1012 (CC) para 25. 
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them as its indirect investment option. This is because such a debt builds 
up with interest until the member exits the fund. On the date when the 
divorcing member would be exiting the fund, the total value of the pension 
benefits would be determined through actuarial calculations, and such 
benefits would be effectively reduced by the amount of the debt determined 
by the fund's actuaries.  
It is possible for the divorced member to reduce the debt by periodic 
payments during his or her period of service in the fund, but this does not 
make the system reasonable. I have argued that the system is 
unreasonable to the extent that it can be challenged on constitutional 
grounds, in that first it infringes upon the divorced members’ rights to social 
security to the extent that it could potentially reduce their pension benefits, 
leading them to depend on the state post their retirement. Secondly, I have 
argued that the system is discriminatory to the extent that it is applicable to 
members of the GEPF only and not to members of other pension funds. It 
is recommended that the board of trustees should amend the rules 
governing the GEPF in order to remove this debt system, because it 
unnecessarily prejudices its members. 
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